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Abstract1 
 
Beyond the opposition ‘EU – civilian and soft power’ versus ‘US – military and hard 
power’, it is time to consider significant changes in foreign policy on both sides of the 
Atlantic. On the one hand, the EU is trying to develop its military capabilities; on the 
other hand, the US is aspiring to modernize and rebuild its civilian capabilities. This 
paper focuses on the recent developments which have occurred in the United 
States as well as on the impact of these changes on the transatlantic security 
partnership. It asks to what extent the US turn towards ‘smart power’ constitutes a 
significant shift in US security strategy likely to have an impact on the transatlantic 
security partnership. Since the election of Barack Obama, the debate on US 
instruments of power and influence has become particularly relevant. In fact, a new 
foreign policy doctrine based on the concept of ‘smart power’ is emerging in 
Washington, D.C. This doctrine relies on the idea that the combination of ‘hard 
power’ and ‘soft power’ will allow the United States to build an appropriate 
framework to tackle today’s unconventional threats. The new US President intends to 
strike a balance between the three ‘Ds’: defense, diplomacy and development, by 
rebuilding the civilian diplomatic and development capacities. The emergence of 
American ‘smart power’ represents a significant shift in US national security strategy, 
and although it is too early to judge the extent to which the new US administration is 
willing to embrace this concept in practice, a new impetus is given to the 
transatlantic security partnership. 
 
                                                           
1 The author would like to thank Professor S. Fröhlich for his assistance while writing her Master's 
thesis, which this paper builds on, as well as all officials who agreed to be interviewed. 
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1. Beyond ‘Mars and Venus’: Why Do We Have to Reconsider the Opposition 
‘EU – Soft Power’ versus ‘US – Hard Power’? 
 
Beyond the well-known opposition ‘EU – civilian and soft power’ versus ‘US – military 
and hard power’, it is now time to consider significant changes in foreign policy on 
both sides of the Atlantic. On the one hand, the European Union is engaged in a 
process to develop its military capabilities (‘hard power’ tools). This process takes 
time, but the EU has already launched several capability initiatives; the adoption of 
the ‘Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities’ in December 2008 attests to the EU’s 
will to remedy its military capability shortfalls.2 On the other hand, the United States is 
aspiring to modernize its civilian capabilities and to develop its ‘soft power’ tools. 
Drawing lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – in which military victory 
seems impossible – the US has begun to realize the limits of military power. In fact, the 
growth of US defense budgets contrasts with the civilian capability shortfall and the 
lack of support for diplomacy and development. But since the second mandate of 
the Bush administration, the United States has been reconsidering the necessity for 
rebuilding non-military instruments of US national power.  
These recent developments on both sides of the Atlantic seem to render Robert 
Kagan’s approach obsolete: we cannot assert today that “Europe is turning away 
from power”,3 whereas the US is “exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian 
world”.4 We cannot continue to oppose consistently the US and the EU as if they 
operate on two different planets with radically different understandings of the 
instruments of power. I will focus here on the recent developments which have 
occurred in the United States and their potential impact on the transatlantic 
ystone of the new US foreign policy, a concept 
                        
relationship.  
Since the election of the new US President, the debate on US instruments of power 
and influence has become particularly relevant. A new foreign policy doctrine 
based on the concept of ‘smart power’ is emerging in Washington, D.C. This doctrine 
relies on the idea that the combination of ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ will allow 
the US to build an appropriate framework to tackle today’s unconventional threats. 
‘Smart power’ seems to be the ke
                                    
gan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, London, 
2 Council of the European Union, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, Brussels, 11 
December 2008. 
3 R. Ka
Atlantic Books, 2004, p. 4. 
4 Ibid. 
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that can be explained as follows:5 
Thesis: ‘hard power’: “power to coerce” through military, economic and financial 
ower’ tools are 
nd tool kit to achieve American 
security strategy likely to have an impact on the 
power.6 
Antithesis: ‘smart power’: “power to attract”, “the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments”7 (based on the policies, 
culture and political ideals of one country). Examples of ‘soft p
diplomacy, development and communication (public diplomacy). 
Synthesis: ‘smart power’: neither ‘hard’, nor ‘soft power’, but “the skillful combination 
of both”.8 According to the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, “smart power means 
developing an integrated strategy, resource base, a
objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power”.9 
Though the United States has tended to over-rely on ‘hard power’ over the last few 
years, today there is a will to “restore the full spectrum of US national power”10 by 
rebuilding ‘soft power’ tools. The new US President intends to strike a balance 
between the three ‘Ds’ – defense, diplomacy and development – by rebuilding US 
civilian diplomatic and development capacities. Such a shift in US foreign policy 
could constitute one of the most significant changes in US national security strategy 
in decades. It will also mean that Joseph Nye is likely to replace Robert Kagan as the 
main theorist of US foreign policy.11 Six years ago, Joseph Nye concluded his book on 
Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics by asserting: “America’s success 
will depend upon our developing a deeper understanding of the role of soft power 
and developing a better balance of hard and soft power in our foreign policy. That 
will be smart power. We have done it before, we can do it again”.12 This paper aims 
to analyze the new focus of the US administration on the integration of US instruments 
of power and influence: to what extent does the US turn towards ‘smart power’ 
constitute a significant shift in US 
transatlantic security partnership? 
                                                           
5 H. Hertzberg, “Smart Power”, The New Yorker, 26 January 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/ 
 Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p. 
edia.csis.org/ 
wer/071105_CSIS_Smart_Power_Report.pdf, retrieved 5 February 2009. 
 
6 January 2009. 
talk/2009/01/26/090126ta_talk_hertzberg, retrieved 11 February 2009. 
6 J.S.
5.  
7 Ibid., p. X.  
8 R.L. Armitage & J.S. Nye, “CSIS Commission on Smart Power – A Smarter, More Secure 
America”,  CSIS – Bipartisan Commission on Smart Power, 2007, p. 7, http://m
smartpo
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid., p. 4.  
11 M .  K a b a l a n ,  “ O b a m a  M a y  U s e  S o f t  P o w e r ” ,  Gulf News, 22 January 2009,
http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/world/10277824.html, retrieved 2
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The analysis is mainly based on official speeches from members of the previous and 
current US administrations, reports published by American and European think tanks, 
institutes and research centers, interviews with officials from the European 
Commission, the Council of the EU, the French Ministry of Defense and US-CREST as 
well as conferences attended at the US Mission to the EU and at the European 
Commission. First, I will focus on the efforts made by the Bush administration to 
modernize non-military instruments of national power and determine why invest-
ments in ‘soft power’ tools have been limited. Then, I will analyze the Obama 
administration’s projects, which aim to rebuild civilian diplomatic and development 
capacities and identify the conditions under which the administration can 
uccessfully implement a ‘smart power’ strategy. Finally, I will outline the impact of 
e to Incorporate ‘Soft Power’ in US National Strategy 
 
oreign Policy 
stration was convinced that ‘hard power’, the most direct and visible 
                                                          
s
this change in US foreign policy on the transatlantic security partnership.  
 
2. Bush’s Failur
 
2.1. Reliance on ‘Hard Power’: Bush’s First Term Based on a Unilateralist Militaristic
F
 
2.1.1. “There are more musicians in the military bands than there are US diplomats”13 
 
There is no denying that Robert Kagan exerted significant influence over the White 
House during Bush jr’s first term, advocating the use of ‘hard power’ to achieve US 
foreign policy goals. There was a tendency to assimilate ‘soft power’ to popularity, 
and the Bush team considered that US foreign policy should not be guided by such 
an ephemeral element.14 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even declared that 
he did not understand the concept of ‘soft power’ in itself.15 The influence of realist 
thinking on US foreign policy was expressed by military activism and unilateralism. The 
Bush admini
source of American power, could allow the US to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives.  
As a result, there has been a significant contrast between the growth of the US 
defense budget and the lack of support for development and diplomacy. Military 
spending totals nearly $500 billion annually – excluding Iraq and Afghanistan –, 
 
build the US Foreign Service”, Foreign 
The Decline of America’s Soft Power”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 3, May – June 
 
12 J.S. Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics, op.cit., p. 147.  
13 J.A. Holmes, “Where Are the Civilians? How to Re
Affairs, vol. 88, no. 1, January – February 2009, p. 150.  
14 J.S. Nye, “
2004, p. 16.
15 Ibid.  
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whereas the State Department’s budget totals $36 billion.16 The Pentagon is 
unquestionably the best resourced and best trained arm of the US government. It 
can even be argued that the Pentagon spends more on health care for military 
personnel than the government allocates to foreign assistance and diplomacy.17 This 
his amounts to a ten percent increase 
ver 25 years, but there are 24 more countries in the world and US national interests 
ree times as many people as it has today.20  
ssions’ of the US military.22 
imbalance between US funding for defense and US funding for diplomacy and 
development demonstrates that US policymakers conceive of defense, diplomacy 
and development – the three pillars of US national security – separately.  
Even though development was elevated as a third pillar of US national security in the 
US National Security Strategy of 2002, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) has weakened year after year. There have been significant 
staff cuts which have led to the closing of missions in several countries. Not only 
USAID, but also the Department of State (DoS) has suffered from under-funding. 
Anthony Holmes has explained that there were 6,636 foreign service officers and 
4,919 support staff in the DoS in June 2008.18 T
o
are less concentrated than in the past.19 Holmes estimates that the DoS needs two to 
th
 
2.1.2. Consequences of the Imbalance between Defense, Diplomacy and 
Development 
 
With the Bush administration giving priority to ‘hard power’ tools, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) became the default agency for US foreign engagement. Given that 
the Department of State, USAID and other civilian agencies are weakening, the DoD 
is acting to fill the vacuum. In that context, the Pentagon’s role is expanding in 
stabilization and reconstruction operations, nation-building and development 
activities as well as humanitarian assistance. This expansion of the military outside of 
its core competence was enshrined in the Department of Defense’s Directive 
3000.0521 which designates stability operations as ‘core mi
Hence, stabilization and reconstruction missions are elevated to the same level as 
traditional combat missions. However, the risks associated with such a situation where 
                                                           
16 J.S. Nye, “The US Can Reclaim Smart Power”, Los Angeles Times, 21 January 2009. 
acekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military 
Involvement”, Congressional Research Service, 24 January 2007, p. 11.  
17 Holmes, op.cit., p. 150.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 151.  
20 Ibid.  
21 “Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 
Operations”, 2005. 
22 N.M. Serafino, “Pe
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the military is replacing the civilians cannot be denied.   
The military is, however, not trained and ill-suited to perform civilian tasks like 
reconstruction and stabilization activities after a conflict. Not only are soldiers not 
trained to perform functions traditionally suited to DoS or USAID personnel, but 
military objectives can conflict with US foreign policy and development goals. There 
is a risk that “US foreign and development policies may become subordinated to a 
narrow, short-term security agenda at the expense of broader, long-term diplomatic 
d affairs as “desirable”, 
nd it fell to 36% in 2004.25 In fact, neglecting ‘soft power’ instruments was a huge 
rst term, Bush realized that US military power was an inadequate basis for sustaining 
2.2.1. Bush’s Initiatives to Develop Civilian Instruments of National Security 
 
During his second term, Bush tried to put more emphasis on non-military instruments 
goals and institution-building efforts”.23 Moreover, the deployment of the military to 
perform stabilization and reconstruction tasks can be counterproductive, as soldiers 
can be seen with suspicion by the local population. In such a case, the coherence 
of US foreign policy as well as the image of the US abroad are put in jeopardy.  
The growing involvement of the Pentagon in development activities can also have 
unanticipated and unfortunate consequences. Between 1998 and 2005, the DoD’s 
share of US Official Development Assistance (ODA) rose from 3,5% to 22%, whereas 
USAID’s share decreased from 65% to less than 40% in the same period.24 The 
Pentagon is rivaling USAID even though it does not have the necessary expertise and 
comparative advantage to deal with development activities. Moreover, Bush 
neglected critical elements of ‘soft power’ based on dialogue, communication and 
persuasion. As a result, the Bush administration has been the most unpopular 
administration in US history. According to a survey from the German Marshall Fund of 
the US, in 2002 64% of Europeans viewed US leadership in worl
a
mistake, all the more as the US is engaged in a ‘war of ideas’. Only at the end of his 
fi
American power over time, and he tried to alter his strategy.  
 
2.2. Modernizing and Rebuilding Non-military Instruments of National Power: A Failed 
Attempt of Bush’s Second Term 
 
                                                           
23 S. Patrick & K. Brown, “The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s 
Expanding Role”, Center for Global Development – Working Paper, no. 131, November 2007, 
p. I. 
24 Patrick & Brown, op.cit., p. 4.  
25 “Transatlantic Trends 2008 Partners”, The German Marshall Fund of the United States & the 
Compagnia di San Paolo, 2008, p. 6, http://www.flad.pt/documentos/ 
1221060132G9cYR3ke7Be26BN1.pdf, retrieved 22 February 2009. 
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of national power. This shift in US strategy was mainly advocated by the new 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who explained that the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan had demonstrated that “military success is not sufficient to win”,26 thus 
justifying a “need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of 
000 volunteers 
                                                          
national security”.27 As a result, different initiatives were taken between 2004 and 
2008 in order to develop non-military instruments of US power.  
The centerpiece of Bush’s efforts to develop civilian instruments was the creation of 
the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) under the 
Secretary of State in July 2004. The goal of this office is to develop mechanisms to 
strengthen civilian capabilities and to improve inter-agency cooperation in planning 
and conducting stabilization and reconstruction activities. One of the main 
achievements of the S/CRS has been the creation of the Civilian Response Corps, 
officially launched by Condoleezza Rice in July 2008. The former Secretary of State is 
convinced that “stabilization and reconstruction is a mission that civilians must 
lead”28 in order to allow the military to focus on its core responsibilities. This inter-
agency body will be composed of three separate pools of trained civilians which 
can rapidly respond to stabilization and reconstruction emergencies. The Active 
Component (CRC-A) is a team of ‘first responders’ composed of diplomats and 
interagency federal employees (coming from the DoS, USAID and other executive 
branch agencies). The CRC-A was created in 2006 and will ultimately consist of 250 
members.29 Today the majority of CRC-A members is deployed in Afghanistan. The 
Standby Component (CRC-S), created in 2006, is composed of active and retired 
federal employees and will ultimately comprise 2,000 members. These volunteers are 
available to supplement the Active Component in case of need to respond to 
stabilization and reconstruction emergencies, as in Lebanon, Nepal or Darfur. Finally, 
the Reserve Component (CRC-R) will ultimately be composed of 2,
from civilian life, from the private sector and from state and local governments, who 
will bring additional skills for stabilization and reconstruction activities.  
Another key element of Bush’s new approach was the emphasis on interagency 
cooperation and coordination, that is to say the need to integrate civilian and 
 
26 R.M. Gates, “Landon Lecture – Kansas State University”, Manhattan, Kansas, 26 November 
2007,  http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199, retrieved 12 
January 2009. 
27 Ibid.  
28 US Department of State – Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 
“Civilian Response – The Newsletter of S/CRS”, issue no. 6, August – September 2008, p. 5, 
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=499F, retrieved 21 
March 2009.  
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military activities. The Counterinsurgency Manual published in 2006 highlights this 
change: “Although military efforts are necessary and important, they are only 
effective if integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of 
national power”.30 The establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 
 approach, 
emocracy promotion and nation-building are at the core of US strategy, which is 
o-cons of the second Bush administration 
34 Congress 
Although the Counterinsurgency Manual specified that “it is better to entrust civilian 
                              
Afghanistan and in Iraq is in line with this approach, as PRTs are joint civilian-military 
teams. 
Finally, Condoleezza Rice launched an initiative to reorganize the personnel and the 
practices of the DoS: ‘transformational diplomacy’. With this new
d
based on diplomacy as such, foreign assistance and ‘soft power’.  
 
2.2.2. But “building up civilian capacity is easier to advocate than to execute”31 
 
Beyond the self-satisfied speeches of the Bush administration, it seems that there has 
been a gap between political commitments and reality, between the level of 
ambition and the financial resources devoted to new projects. It can be argued that 
“the adoption of Nye’s approach by the ne
was mere rhetoric. Neo-cons offered not different goals but a calmer and more 
measured path towards the same ones”.32  
In fact, civilian instruments remained underfunded and understaffed at the end of 
Bush’s second mandate. For example, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruc-
tion and Stabilization (S/CRS) did not have an adequate level of funding to meet its 
ambitious mandate. In January 2009, only 112 persons were working in this office,33 
and the Active Component (CRC-A) was composed of only 15 members.
was particularly hesitant to provide the adequate funding for this program and the 
S/CRS ‘survived’ because it was mainly funded by the DoD.  
In addition, it seems that the military is still replacing civilians on the ground, and it 
might be difficult to reverse this tendency as it has become common practice. 
                              
une 2006, p. 34, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-
cked Team for a Sweeping Shift in Foreign Policy”, The New York 
2008.  
ion 
ction Capabilities”, Congressional Research Service, 5 February 2009, p. 14. 
29 Ibid., p. 15.  
30 D.H. Petraeus & J.N. Mattis, Counterinsurgency Manual, Headquarters – Department of the 
Army, Washington, D.C., 16 J
24fd.pdf, retrieved 3 April 2009. 
31 D.E. Sanger, “A Handpi
Times, 1 December 
32 Kabalan, op.cit.  
33 Nina M. Serafino, “Peacekeeping / Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and 
Congressional Action on the Civilian Response / Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilizat
and Reconstru
34 Ibid., p. 15. 
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tasks to civilians”,35 it also mentioned that “if adequate civilian capacity is not 
available, members of the military forces must be prepared to fill the gap”,36 and 
“the soldier must then be prepared to become […] a social worker, a civil engineer, 
a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout”.37 In fact, soldiers are now used to replace 
civilians and if the CRC is not rapidly staffed, soldiers are likely to continue performing 
 
nd his second term, results were below 
xpectations at the end of his presidency. 
 Power’: Obama’s Will to Integrate US 
                                                          
civilian tasks in the coming years.  
Regarding interagency cooperation and coordination, it seems there is a huge gap 
between the objective and reality. When he was in Afghanistan in July 2008, 
Ambassador Herbst declared: “our office has wonderful cooperation with the 
military”.38 Yet interagency cooperation is limited because of institutional rivalries 
between the Pentagon and the DoS. On the one hand, presidential directive 
NSPD44 assigns the State Department the lead responsibility for the development of 
civilian capacities and the coordination of the interagency process. On the other 
hand, Directive 3000.05 designates stability operations as core missions of the US 
military. This ambiguity regarding task sharing between the DoD and the DoS limits 
the cooperation between them. For example, each of the US-led PRTs in Afghanistan
includes 50 to 100 soldiers, but none of them has more than a half-dozen civilians.39  
Lastly, it can be argued that Rice’s initiative to transform US diplomacy failed. It was 
mainly about diplomacy to support the neo-cons agenda. The principal shortcoming 
was the lack of funding, as poorly trained and underfunded diplomats cannot 
undertake the activities she advocated. Even if we cannot deny that there was a 
shift in Bush’s strategy between his first a
e
 
3. Aligning ‘Soft Power’ with ‘Hard
Instruments of Power and Influence 
 
3.1. Emergence of a New US Foreign Policy Doctrine Based on ‘Smart Power’ 
 
3.1.1. “You can be too hard, you can be too soft, but you can’t be too smart”40 
 
Since 2004, a new philosophy of action has emerged in Washington, D.C., based on 
 
35 Petraeus & Mattis, op.cit., p. 41. 
36 Ibid., p. 35. 
37 Ibid., p. 41. 
38 J.E. Herbst, “Briefing on Civilian Stabilization Initiative”, Briefing by the Coordinator for the 
Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, Washington, D.C., 14 February 2008, 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/state/100913.pdf, retrieved 21 March 2009.  
39 K. DeYoung, “Foreign Service Jobs in Afghanistan to Grow”, The Washington Post, 24 March 
2009. 
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the will to find an alternative to Bush’s militaristic and unilateralist foreign policy. In 
2004, Suzanne Nossel wrote an article in Foreign Affairs trying for the first time to 
theorize ‘smart power’ and proposing to renew the doctrine of liberal internation-
alism.41 On the one hand, she argued that “smart power means knowing that the 
United States’ own hand is not always its best tool” and she tried to restore the value 
of multilateralism.42 On the other hand, she explained that the US should take into 
account all instruments of US power: “unlike conservatives, who rely on military power 
as the main tool of statecraft, liberal internationalists see trade, diplomacy, foreign 
aid and the spread of American values as equally important”.43 Joseph Nye was the 
first to give a clear definition of ‘smart power’ which is “neither hard, nor soft, it is 
both”.44 He is convinced that integrating all US instruments of power and influence, 
military and civilian instruments, ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ tools, will help the US 
tackle tough global challenges. Suzanne Nossel and Joseph Nye can be considered 
the ‘founding parents’ of ‘smart power’, but we should not underestimate the role 
different think tanks have played since 2004 trying to provide a policy and 
                                                          
intellectual framework for the new administration.  
The emergence of a ‘smart power’ strategy is in line with a ‘progressive realist’ 
foreign policy. ‘Progressive realism’ was suggested by Robert Wright in 2006 in an 
article in the New York Times as “a realism that could attract many liberals and a 
progressivism that could attract some conservatives”.45 This new foreign policy 
paradigm can reconcile “the humanitarian aims of idealists with the powerful logic 
of realists”.46 Beyond the well-known opposition between realism and idealism, 
‘progressive realism’ seems to be the appropriate foreign policy doctrine to sustain 
American power over time. This new doctrine implies a realist assessment of the 
threats and of the limits of US power and emphasizes the necessity of cooperating 
with other countries and within international institutions (we can also use the concept 
‘cooperative realism’). As Joseph Nye argued, a ‘progressive realist’ policy stresses 
“the importance of developing an integrated grand strategy that combines hard 
military power with soft attractive power into smart power”.47 During his speech at 
 
40 Hertzberg, op.cit. 
41 S. Nossel, “Smart Power”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 2, March – April 2004, p. 6. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p. 1.  
44 Nye, Soft Power : the Means to Success in World Politics, op.cit., p. XIII. 
45 R. Wright, “An American Foreign Policy that Both Realists and Idealists Should Fall in Love 
With”, The New York Times, 16 July 2006. 
46 Ibid.  
47 J.S. Nye, “Progressive Realism”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs – Harvard 
University, Cambridge, 25 August 2006, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1593/ 
progressive_realism.html, retrieved 6 April 2009. 
  12 EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2010 
the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in December 2009, Obama endorsed this new 
thinking (progressive or cooperative realism) by asserting that he rejected the choice 
etween an idealist and a realist approach of foreign policy.48   
elaborated the ‘smart power’ 
                                                          
b
 
3.1.2. ‘Smart Power’ Strategy: the Keystone of Obama’s Foreign Policy 
 
‘Smart power’ has become the core principle of Obama’s foreign policy and an 
analysis of Obama’s speeches, as well as speeches by Joe Biden and by Hillary 
Clinton, demonstrates that all advocate a ‘smart power’ strategy. During a speech 
at the Woodrow Wilson Center in August 2007, Obama already claimed: “we need 
to integrate all aspects of American might” and “we must improve our civilian 
capacity”.49 He also explained that he will not hesitate to use the power of American 
diplomacy, as “the lesson of the Bush years is that not talking does not work”.50 
During her confirmation hearing, Clinton explicitly endorsed ‘smart power’ as a new 
foreign policy strategy: “We must use what has been called ‘smart power’ the full 
range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and 
cultural – picking the right tool or combination of tools for each situation”.51 This new 
approach of the Obama administration is also perceptible in Joe Biden’s statements. 
In his speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, the US Vice 
President focused on two key elements of a ‘smart power’ strategy: cooperation 
and partnerships with other countries as well as dialogue. He asserted: “we will work 
in partnership whenever we can, alone only when we must”.52 Contrary to Bush’s 
approach, Biden stressed the necessity for cooperating with nations around the 
world and added: “We believe that international alliances and organizations do not 
diminish America’s power […] So we will engage. We will listen. We will consult”.53 
These statements reveal the influence of American think tanks. In fact, many people 
who were working in these think tanks and research centers are now working for the 
new administration.54 It means that the people who 
 
48 B. Obama, “Obama’s Nobel Remarks“, Oslo, 10 December 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/12/11/world/europe/11prexy.text.html, retrieved 20 December 2009.  
49 B. Obama, “Speech at Woodrow Wilson Centre”, Washington, D.C., 1 August 2007, p. 3, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13974, retrieved 8 January 2009. 
50 Ibid., p. 4.  
51 H. Clinton, “Nomination Hearings to be Secretary of State”, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Washington, D.C., 13 January 2009, p. 12, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 
2009a/01/115196.htm, retrieved 31 March 2009.  
52 J.R. Biden, “Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference”, Munich, 7 February 2009, p. 2, 
http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&sprache=en&id=23
8&, retrieved 7 April 2009. 
53 Ibid., p. 3.  
54 For example, seven members of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) have been 
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approach have now the opportunity to implement it.  
Implementing a ‘smart power’ strategy will take time, but one year after Obama’s 
arrival in the White House, we can already see some signs of implementation. 
Obama’s first decisions in office aimed at marking the policy reversal after the end of 
Bush’s terms: he issued orders to close the detention camp at Guantanamo within a 
year and to put an end to the CIA’s use of ‘enhanced interrogation’ methods (in 
order to ban torture). According to Nathalie Nougayrède, “ce geste sur les valeurs – 
la fermeture de Guantanamo – ressuscite le soft power américain auprès des 
Européens”.55 In addition, Obama’s new strategy in Afghanistan constitutes a first 
sign of implementation of a ‘smart power’ strategy. It reveals a new focus on civilian 
efforts: not only has Obama promised to send more troops to Afghanistan, but he 
has also emphasized the need for increasing the number of civilians on the ground. 
According to the President, agricultural specialists and educators, lawyers and 
engineers need to be deployed because US “efforts will fail in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan if we do not invest in their future”.56 However, when I asked an American 
diplomat working at the US Mission to the EU about his position on this civilian ‘surge’, 
he emphasized the need for security reinforcement first, as it is very difficult to deploy 
civilians if the environment is not secure enough.57 In addition, the NATO Foreign 
Ministerial meeting on 3-4 December 2009 demonstrated that security reinforcement 
n the ground through additional military efforts has become a priority. 
.2. Rebuilding the Civilian Diplomatic and Development Capacity: a Challenge for 
Prevention and Resolution” which will “support high-level negotiations and provide 
                                                          
o
 
3
the New Administration 
 
3.2.1. Elevating Diplomacy and Development: “yes, we can!” 
 
One of the key priorities of Obama’s ‘smart power’ strategy is to rebuild the 
diplomatic and development capabilities in order to strike a new balance between 
the three pillars of US national security (defense, diplomacy and development). First, 
Obama has pledged to make diplomacy a priority: he is willing to strengthen the 
Department of State through long-term investments in expanding and training the 
diplomatic staff. In addition, Obama intends to create a new “Office of Conflict 
 
55 N. Nougayrède, “Le Sommet de l’OTAN et le Retour du Lien Transatlantique”, Le Monde, 2 
April 2009. 
56 B. Obama, “Remarks on New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Washington, D.C., 27 
March 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/politics/27obama-text.html, retrieved 7 
April 2009. 
57 “Conferences at the US mission to the EU”, question asked to Mr. Lou Bono (Environment, 
Science, Technology & Energy Unit Chief), Brussels, 17 April 2009. 
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the expertise and capacity to seize opportunities or address crises as they arise”.58  
Moreover, Obama is willing to launch a comprehensive program of public 
diplomacy: he wants to open “America Houses” in Muslim countries “with Internet, 
libraries, English lessons, stories of America’s Muslims and the strength they add to our 
country”.59 He also aspires to create a new “America’s Voice Corps” which will be 
composed of trained young Americans “who can speak with – and listen to – the 
people who today hear about us only from our enemies”.60 Through these programs, 
Obama wants to reverse the perception of American arrogance and to restore the 
US image in the world. This new emphasis on strategic communication, particularly 
with the Muslim world, was made clear during Obama’s interview with Al Arabiya 
one week after his arrival in the White House and during his speech in Cairo in June 
2009. Pointing out the fact that he has lived in Muslim countries, Barack Obama 
repeated several times that his job is to “communicate to the American people that 
the Muslim world is filled with extraordinary people who simply want to live their lives” 
and to “communicate to the Muslim world that the Americans are not [their] 
enemy”.61 
Not only does Obama intend to invest in diplomacy, but he wants to put a strong 
emphasis on US foreign assistance and development. During his campaign, Obama 
pledged to double US aid to $50 billion by 2012. Moreover, the new US President is 
willing to invest adequate resources in order to restructure, to empower and to 
properly staff USAID as well as to reform the infrastructure that manages US foreign 
assistance.62 
Beyond this will to strike a new balance between the ‘three Ds’, the new President is 
promoting an interagency approach in order to integrate civilian and military 
capabilities. For example, he is willing to create “Mobile Development Teams” (MDTs) 
which will bring together personnel from the Pentagon, the military, the DoS and 
USAID (to be deployed for state-building, counter-terror and post-conflict 
operations63). Moreover, Obama plans to increase the authority and the 
coordinating role of the National Security Council with a Deputy National Security 
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Advisor empowered to develop integrated strategies.64 However, according to 
François Raffenne, “il sera difficile de renforcer l’autorité décisionnelle du NSC car 
cela irait à l’encontre de la tradition américaine de peu centralizer”.65  
 
3.2.2. Conditions for a Successful Implementation of a ‘Smart Power’ Strategy 
 
Several obstacles might impede the US President from implementing his projects such 
as a budgetary restraint, due to the current financial and economic crisis, and 
Congressional restraint. How is Barack Obama trying to overcome these obstacles? Is 
it realistic to rebuild US civilian diplomatic and development capacities in a context 
of deep recession?  
Obama’s 2010 budget request submitted to Congress on 7 May 2009 reveals that the 
President is willing to stick to his goals. He advocated $53,9 billion for the Department 
of State and other international programs,66 of which $36,5 billion for foreign 
assistance (a 2% increase over the 2009 budget). It is explicitly mentioned that this 
budget “includes funding for the first year of a multi-year effort to significantly 
increase the size of the Foreign Service at both the Department of State and the 
USAID”.67 Obama considers that new investments in civilian capabilities will relieve 
the burden on US troops and save money in the long term: “it is far cheaper to train a 
policeman to secure their villages or to help a farmer seed a crop, than it is to send 
our troops”.68 At the same time Obama requested an increase of the Department of 
Defense’s budget: $663,8 billion for 2010, including $130,0 billion to support 
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.69 This constitutes an 
increase of 4% from the 2009 budget. Obama’s budget request incorporates 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ recommendations to adapt the Pentagon to 
unconventional wars. Gates advocated a shift in priorities: he proposed boosting the 
funding for intelligence and surveillance equipment and increasing the size of the 
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Army while also cutting the funding for traditional weapons systems.70  
Given the current economic crisis, it was a real challenge for Obama to convince 
Congress to support his budget proposals by increasing both the DoS’ and the 
Pentagon’s budgets. On 9 July 2009, the House approved H.R.3081 which provides 
$49 billion for State Department and foreign operations funding for 2010,71 $4,9 billion 
less than the administration’s request.72 On the contrary, Congress authorized in 
October 2009 a total of $680,2 billion for the DoD’s budget, $14,9 million more than 
Obama requested.73 Moreover, the administration is likely to submit a supplemental 
funding request to Congress in February 2010 as the approved budget does not take 
into account Obama’s announcement on 1 December 200974 that he intended to 
deploy 30,000 additional troops in Afghanistan in 2010.75  
Even if it seems that Congress supported most of Obama’s proposals, it was more 
reluctant to increase the DoS’s budget than the Pentagon’s budget. For example, 
the House bill did not match the administration’s request concerning the Civilian 
Stabilization Initiative: whereas Obama requested $323 million for this initiative (a 
331% increase over the 2009 budget), the House bill provides only $155 million76 (but 
this still constitutes a significant progress, as Congress authorized only $75 million for 
this initiative in 2009). Bipartisan support in Congress is indispensable in order to 
implement Obama’s projects. That is why the government has to develop 
communication strategies to convince Capitol Hill of the ‘added value’ of civilian 
capabilities, all the more as it is difficult to demonstrate the short-term impact of 
civilian capabilities on critical challenges (like Afghanistan).  
It seems that Obama overcame most budgetary and Congressional constraints. 
However, strong leadership from the presidential level and political will from the 
different agencies are still key conditions to succeed in developing civilian 
capabilities and in integrating these capabilities with other tools of US power. This is 
all the more necessary as “some obstacles to personnel cooperation cannot be 
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entirely overcome by legislation”,77 given the huge differences in cultures, values 
and perspectives between US military and civilian personnel. If Obama succeeds in 
implementing his new strategy, this might have a significant impact on the relations 
with the European Union.  
 
4. A Turning Point in Transatlantic Relations: Towards a New EU-US Security 
Partnership?  
 
4.1. Hopes for the Opening of a New Chapter in the History of Transatlantic Relations 
 
4.1.1. ‘Obamania’ in Europe: “anything but Bush is better” 
 
After Bush’s ‘demonization’ over the last years, Europeans hope to repair the 
transatlantic rupture. A recent survey demonstrates that three in four Europeans 
supported Obama’s handling of international affairs in 2009 (compared with just 
one-in-five during Bush’s last year in office).78 The decision in October 2009 to award 
Obama the Nobel Peace Prize symbolizes the Europeans’ high expectations towards 
the new US President.79 
Europeans did not approve Bush’s militaristic and unilateralist foreign policy and 
Bush’s aversion to diplomacy and multilateralism seriously undermined transatlantic 
cooperation. Moreover, there was a growing disparity between the instruments of 
international policy used on both sides of the Atlantic, and the number of 
contentious issues between Americans and Europeans was growing. In addition, it 
can be argued that “American policy-makers see no reason to listen to their 
European allies”.80 However, Europeans tend to forget that there had been a major 
shift in Bush’s foreign policy from his first to his second term. In fact, Bush was more 
willing to talk with Europeans, and he was the first US President to visit the EU 
institutions in Brussels in 2005. This change of tone in Washington, D.C., has led to a 
strengthening EU-US cooperation on different issues. For example, a Work Plan on EU-
US cooperation in crisis management and conflict prevention was signed in March 
2008. In addition, after Bush’s initial hostility to the development of the European 
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Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), there was a significant change of tone, as the US 
Ambassador to NATO declared in February 2008: “Europe needs, the United States 
needs, the democratic world needs a stronger, more capable European defense 
capacity”.81 Another step was reached with the first American participation in an 
ESDP mission (EULEX-Kosovo since October 2008). Nevertheless, even if “the 
temperature of the disputes has been reduced by talking about them”,82 we should 
not overestimate the scope of EU-US cooperation on security issues. The Bush 
administration was still lacking European support on several key issues, and surveys 
showed that European confidence in US leadership constantly declined.83 The shift in 
the US approach during Bush’s second term was not sufficient to heal the wounds 
that Washington’s reputation had suffered.84  
The election of a new US President has been perceived as an opportunity to 
revitalize the EU-US partnership and to enlarge the transatlantic agenda. Despite the 
decline of Obama’s approval ratings during his first year in office, the US President is 
still more popular in Europe (77%) than in the US (57%).85 Obama’s commitment to 
multilateralism and to diplomacy has been considered a positive signal in Europe. 
Some members of the new administration have emphasized the necessity to 
strengthen the EU-US partnership: “America has no better partner than Europe”.86 
During the interviews I made, I asked people to what extent they could feel the 
change (at their level) in the US approach since Obama’s arrival in the White House. 
Some officers from the French Ministry of Defense87 emphasized that there have 
been certain points of continuity since Bush’s second term. All the people I met 
(particularly in the European institutions) underlined the intensity of transatlantic 
contacts since Obama took office. But beyond European hopes, how can the US 
shift towards ‘smart power’ significantly strengthen EU-US relations? 
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4.1.2. Towards a Convergence of European and American Strategic Thinking? 
 
As the President of the European Commission argued, “the good news about the 
new [American] administration is that they are closer to our European model and our 
European values”.88 In fact, the ‘smart power’ approach adopted by the Obama 
administration seems quite close to European strategic thinking. First of all, a ‘smart 
power’ strategy implies a strong commitment to multilateralism which is a key 
European value emphasized in the European Security Strategy (ESS): “we need to 
pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international 
organisations and through partnerships with key actors”.89 In addition, the ESS 
explicitly mentions the need to integrate all instruments of power which has become 
the keystone of Obama‘s strategy: “the full spectrum of instruments for crisis 
management and conflict prevention […] including political, diplomatic, military and 
civilian, trade and development activities”.90  
Europeans have developed powerful civilian and ‘soft power’ instruments, but, 
aware that a comprehensive security strategy requires ‘military power’ instruments as 
well, they have engaged in a process to develop EU military capabilities. If they 
succeed, they will be able to combine both ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ 
instruments into a ‘smart power’ strategy. The situation on the other side of the 
Atlantic is reversed: Americans have realized the limits of ‘hard power’ and the new 
US President is willing to restore US ‘soft power’ and to integrate civilian and military 
instruments into a ‘smart power’ strategy. This means that Europeans and Americans 
are moving in the same direction: both intend to use a strategy based on the 
combination of military and civilian tools. However, whereas the Obama administra-
tion explicitly mentions its will to use ‘smart power’, the EU has never referred to this 
concept in its strategic documents. This convergence of strategic thinking between 
the US and the EU is likely to lead to a strengthening of EU-US cooperation. The shift in 
US strategy implies that US foreign policy might be closer to European values and 
more compatible with European interests. At the NATO summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in 
April 2009, Obama set a new tone for EU-US relations. He asserted that in the US there 
has been “a failure to appreciate Europe’s leading role in the world”91 as well as 
                                                           
88 Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, EU Focus, Washington, D.C., May 2009, 
p. 8, http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2009/EUFocus-HumRts-05-09.pdf, 
retrieved 26 March 2009. 
89 E u r o p e a n  C o u n c i l ,  “ A  S e c u r e  E u r o p e  i n  a  Better World – European Security Strategy”, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 13. 
90 Ibid., p. 11.  
91 H. Cooper & A. Cowell, “Obama Sets a New Tone for Alliance with Europe”, The New York 
Times, 4 April 2009. 
  20 EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2010 
anti-American attitudes in Europe. According to him, “these attitudes have become 
all too common, they are not wise”.92  
                                                          
Today, Europeans and Americans have an opportunity to strengthen the 
transatlantic security partnership and to adapt it to new security challenges. The 
revitalization of a EU-US security partnership might lead to a strengthened coopera-
tion on crisis management, conflict prevention and other security issues. However, it 
is too early to judge, and one of the EU officials I met asserted: “on the specific area 
of crisis management, I do not see so many changes, but I am not really concerned 
about that”.93 Such changes will take time but we can expect a strengthening of 
transatlantic cooperation on security issues in the coming years. Moreover, it seems 
that Americans are willing to learn from Europeans about the development of civilian 
capabilities and civilian crisis management. According to the same EU official, there 
are links between S/CRS and EU institutions and Americans are learning quickly from 
the EU’s experience.94 Such a strengthened cooperation might lead to the adoption 
of an updated ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’ (NTA), to replace the current NTA which 
was adopted in 1995. As Valentin Gescher from the European Commission 
explained, the NTA was adopted under the Spanish presidency, and as Spain 
presides the EU during the first semester 2010, this might facilitate the adoption of a 
new NTA in 2010.95  
Moreover, as NATO is the framework for a EU-US strategic partnership, revitalizing the 
transatlantic partnership implies rebuilding the partnership through NATO. Tensions 
between the two organizations have been reduced because of US support for ESDP 
and France’s reintegration into NATO’s integrated military structure. However, the 
persistent Turkish-Cypriot dispute is still blocking cooperation between the two 
organizations. If Americans and Europeans want to facilitate the emergence of a 
strengthened transatlantic security partnership, they should dedicate more attention 
to helping resolve this contentious issue.  
Americans and Europeans should develop a pragmatic approach if they want to 
overcome potential divisions and to give a new impetus to the transatlantic security 
partnership. What are the necessary conditions to renew the transatlantic security 
contract?  
 
 
92 Ibid. 
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4.2. Transforming the Opportunity into Reality: Conditions for the Emergence of a New 
Transatlantic Security Partnership 
 
4.2.1. Managing Expectations and Understanding Each Other’s Needs: The Key to 
Creating a New Transatlantic Security Contract 
 
The election of Barack Obama has in Europe a messianic dimension and the level of 
expectations has never been so high. However, the more elevated the hopes and 
expectations, the bigger risk to be the disappointments. As Sandschneider argued, 
“expecting too much of the United States is the wrong strategy at the moment”.96 
First, many of these expectations are unrealistic: Europeans should not forget that 
Obama will have to defend American interests first. Then, it can be argued that there 
will be some elements of continuity in US foreign policy and that “the most important 
aspect of Obama’s change is not about concrete policies but about hope”.97 
Europeans should manage their expectations and wait for concrete progress and 
change in US foreign policy. Americans also have many expectations vis-à-vis 
Europeans. Even if they are willing to consult Europeans more often before taking 
decisions, the counterpart will be that Europeans have to share the burden, too. The 
new tone of the Obama administration was perceptible at the NATO summit in April 
2009, where Obama asserted: “We want strong allies. We are not looking to be 
patrons of Europe. We are looking to be partners of Europe”.98 Europeans will no 
longer be able to use the ‘Bush excuse’; it will be much more difficult to say ‘no’ to 
the new US administration. The first issue on the transatlantic agenda which will 
require a clear management of expectations is the war in Afghanistan, where 
burden sharing has become a key issue: “as America does more, we will ask others 
to join us in doing their part”.99 After his announcement on 1 December 2009 to 
deploy 30,000 US troops in 2010, Obama expects to hear pledges of additional 
European troops at the London conference on Afghanistan on 28 January 2010.  
Americans and Europeans will have to make efforts to understand each other’s 
security needs and concerns in order to facilitate cooperation on security issues. 
There is sometimes a lack of understanding between them which creates obstacles 
to strengthened cooperation. For example, there is some incomprehension on the US 
side regarding the role of the gendarmerie in Afghanistan.100 Moreover, both should 
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recognize that their interests might sometimes conflict and that differences between 
them are likely to remain in the future (particularly because of the different strategic 
cultures on both sides of the Atlantic). On this issue Obama asserted: “There have 
been differences between America and Europe. No doubt, there will be differences 
in the future. But the burdens of global citizenship continue to bind us together”.101 
Recognizing the fact that some differences will remain between the EU and the US 
will allow Americans and Europeans to avoid disillusionment in the future.  
Moreover, it can be argued that “Brussels and Washington cannot afford to take 
each other for granted”.102 Americans should not consider European enthusiasm for 
their new President as complacency. And Europeans should not underestimate US 
demands, “assuming a commonality of interest and approach”.103 That is why strong 
political will is necessary on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition, a new framework 
for EU-US discussions could facilitate the emergence of a new transatlantic security 
partnership. There have been some proposals suggesting that the US President could 
be invited once a year to the European Council.104 Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) called in February 2009 for the creation of a Transatlantic Political 
Council which would be chaired by the EU High Representative and by the US 
Secretary of State.105 This body would allow “systematic high-level consultation and 
coordination in respect of foreign and security policy”.106 Moreover, MEPs proposed 
the establishment of a joint parliamentary committee in order to deepen the 
relationship between the European Parliament and the US Congress.107 However, 
one of the key preconditions for the strengthening of transatlantic security coopera-
tion will be the emergence of a coherent European foreign policy.  
 
4.2.2. Emergence of American ‘Smart Power’: A Challenge for the European Union 
 
If the European Union wants to take advantage of the current opportunity to 
develop a new security partnership with the US, it will have to appear as a credible 
and strong actor. If Europeans want to create a ‘partnership of equals’ with the US, 
they will have to act collectively and decisively. They will have to show Americans 
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that it is in the American interest to communicate directly with the European Union 
on many security issues, instead of doing it bilaterally with member states. Therefore, 
it is vital that Europeans ‘speak with one voice’: Obama will not listen to Europe if the 
only thing he can hear coming from the European continent is a cacophony of 
voices. Europeans should have a real strategic discussion on all security issues and 
define a clear European position on each issue. If they succeed in presenting a 
unified European position on security issues, they will be taken more seriously by 
Americans and will increase their weight during discussions with them.  
Not only will Europeans have to ‘speak with one voice’; they will also have to 
develop a more coherent and effective ESDP, particularly through the development 
of military capabilities. Today, Europeans have the opportunity to strengthen 
cooperation with Americans on crisis management issues, but this will be only 
possible if the EU appears as a credible and strong actor with significant capabilities. 
Political will is necessary if Europeans want to remedy the EU’s capability shortfall. In 
fact, the Lisbon Treaty innovations could give a new impetus to European defense 
(for example through the permanent structured cooperation). The development of 
European military capabilities is all the more important as Europeans want to avoid a 
division of labor, meaning that NATO would focus on the military aspects of crisis 
management operations whereas the EU would be in charge of the civilian aspects 
o f  o p e ra t i o n s.  A c c o rd in g  to  R o b e r t K a g an,  th is  d i v is io n  o f  ta s k s  w o u ld  me a n  th a t  
Americans are “making the dinner”,108 whereas Europeans are “doing the dishes”.109 
Today, it seems that Americans and Europeans are not aspiring to such a division of 
labor. Europeans have more experience than Americans on civilian aspects of crisis 
management, but Americans are willing to put more emphasis on civilian 
capabilities in the coming years. At the same time, Europeans seem determined to 
give a new impetus to their military capabilities, in order to be able to conduct 
military operations more easily. It has sometimes been argued that the EU should 
accept to sign a ‘Reverse Berlin-Plus’ agreement with NATO110 in order to allow the 
Atlantic Alliance to use European civilian capabilities under certain conditions.111 
According to one of the EU officials I met, such an agreement could be a good 
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arrangement to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation.112 However, it seems that this 
agreement will hardly be conceivable in the coming years: the EU does not intend to 
be assimilated only to the ‘soft’ side of operations, providing civilian capabilities 
when necessary.  
The EU’s ability to manage American expectations and to emerge as a meaningful 
and credible foreign policy actor will determine the state of EU-US relations in the 
coming years. Today, the EU has to revisit its policies and to propose an agenda that 
both the EU and the US can tackle together. There is a lot at stake for the EU and we 
should not underestimate the obstacles it will have to overcome if it wants to 
succeed.  
 
5. Conclusion: ‘Smart Power’ – “the key to serving America’s interests, 
Europe’s interests and the world’s interests”113 
 
This paper has investigated to what extent the US shift towards ‘smart power’ 
constitutes a significant change in US security strategy likely to have an impact on 
the transatlantic security partnership. As Frank-Walter Steinmeier explained during a 
conference at Harvard University in 2008, ‘smart power’ seems to be the synonym for 
what we need today: “new concepts, a revitalized alliance and particularly 
renewed American leadership in the world”.114 This new strategic concept has 
progressively emerged in Washington, D.C., and intends to go beyond the traditional 
notions of national security by merging ‘soft power’ with ‘hard power’. A ‘smart 
power’ strategy is supposed to restore the full spectrum of US power and is at the 
core of Obama’s foreign policy doctrine. Becoming a ‘smart power’ constitutes a 
huge challenge for the Americans, as their ‘soft power’ has dramatically collapsed 
during the last years and they will have to invest significantly in civilian and ‘soft 
power’ tools. It is too early to judge whether Obama will succeed in overcoming the 
different obstacles and in going beyond rhetoric.  
On the other side of the Atlantic, everybody is paying close attention to what is 
happening in Washington, D.C. In fact, the emergence of American ‘smart power’ 
represents a significant challenge for the EU. Europeans are aware that they are 
facing a unique opportunity not only to repair the transatlantic relationship after the 
                                                           
112 Interview with an EU Official: Council of the EU – DGE, 21 April 2009, op.cit. 
113 F.-W. Steinmeier, “A New Transatlantic Agenda in a Changing World”, Speech at the 
Conference on Germany in the Modern World, Harvard University, Cambridge, 12 April 2008, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080413-BM-
Harvard.html, retrieved 24 January 2009. 
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Bush years, but also to create a new security partnership with the US. However, all will 
depend on the EU’s ability to appear as a meaningful and credible partner. The 
challenge is huge, but Europeans seem to be on the right track as they are trying to 
strengthen their security and defense policy and they are aspiring to develop their 
military capabilities. In addition, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 
2009 might facilitate the strengthening of the EU as a credible foreign policy actor. 
And some innovations of this treaty – like the establishment of a President of the 
European Council – might strengthen the transatlantic cooperation, as it will be 
“easier and less time-consuming”115 for the US President to develop initiatives with the 
President of the European Council rather than with individual member states.  
Today, Americans and Europeans are willing to strengthen transatlantic security 
cooperation. The emergence of ideas to give a new impetus to the transatlantic 
security partnership reveals an amazing shift in political dynamics on both sides of 
the Atlantic. For example, MEPs proposed to replace the NTA by a new transatlantic 
partnership agreement and they recommended that EU-US summits take place 
twice a year “to provide the partnership with strategic direction and impetus”.116 
Given the challenges of the 21st century, Americans and Europeans are going to 
need one another more than ever. It seems that they are moving in the same 
direction, as both are trying to develop the kind of power they are lacking (‘soft’ for 
the US, ‘hard’ for the EU). If we think about a ‘power scale’, both are located today 
at one extremity of the scale (roughly speaking: one as a ‘soft power’, the other as a 
‘hard power’), and they aspire to ‘meet’ in the middle as ‘smart power’.  
According to an EU official, there is a “convergence in philosophies, but not in 
forces”.117 Beyond the convergence in philosophies, it is too early to judge the extent 
to which the new US administration is willing to adapt to the concept of ‘smart 
power’ in practice. Rebuilding US civilian and diplomatic capacities will be a long 
and difficult task, and one year after Obama’s arrival in the White House, it is difficult 
to judge whether the new US administration will manage to take up this challenge. 
For example, despite the fact that the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is one of the key 
priorities of the new administration, only 159 persons were working in the S/CRS in 
January 2010,118 as developing this initiative takes time. Moreover, given the 
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117 Interview with an EU Official: Council of the EU – DGE, 21 April 2009, op.cit.  
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evolution of the security environment in Afghanistan, deploying civilians on the 
ground remains particularly challenging and the DoD’s budget is likely to increase in 
2010 in order to finance the deployment of additional US troops. These develop-
ments should not be at the expense of the efforts to rebuild US diplomatic and 
civilian capacities. On the other side of the Atlantic, it is difficult to determine if there 
is enough EU political will to comply with the necessity of burden sharing between 
the EU and the US. The London conference on Afghanistan in January 2010 will be 
key, as the Obama administration clearly expects European commitments of 
additional troops and resources.  
2010 will be a crucial year on both sides of the Atlantic: on the one hand, the 
Congressional elections in November 2010 might have an influence on the US 
President who will try to deliver results before the elections. On the other hand, 2010 
opens a new era for the European Union with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, providing the EU with the opportunity to become a meaningful and credible 
foreign policy actor. 
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